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Wisconsin’s influential Learnfare initiative is a conditional cash penalty program that sanctions a family’s
welfare grant when covered teens fail to meet school attendance targets. In the presence of reference-dependent
preferences, Learnfare provides uniquely powerful financial incentives for student performance. However,
a 10-county random-assignment evaluation suggested that Learnfare had no sustained effects on school
enrollment and attendance. This study evaluates the data from this randomized field experiment. In
Milwaukee County, the Learnfare procedures were poorly implemented and the random-assignment
process failed to produce balanced baseline traits. However, in the nine remaining counties, Learnfare
increased school enrollment by 3.7 percent (effect size = 0.08) and attendance by 4.5 percent (effect
size = 0.10). The hypothesis of a common treatment effect sustained throughout the six-semester study
period could not be rejected. These effects were larger among subgroups at risk for dropping out of
school (e.g., baseline dropouts, those over age for grade). For example, these heterogeneous treatment
effects imply that Learnfare closed the enrollment gap between baseline dropouts and school attendees
by 41 percent. These results suggest that well-designed financial incentives can be an effective mechanism
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“Eighty percent of success is showing up.” - Woody Allen 
1 - Introduction 
The recent growth in economic inequality and the well-established importance of 
education for economic success have created a focused interest in identifying scalable policies 
that can promote the human-capital accumulation of at-risk youth. Some of the most fundamental 
antecedents to cognitive development are “non-cognitive” traits like academic engagement and 
motivation. However, the deterioration of family environments in recent decades and the relative 
lack of corresponding school and community supports may disadvantage the neediest children 
with respect to the development of these instrumentally relevant traits.  
Concerns like these have motivated a renewed interest in leveraging student’s academic 
engagement and improving cognitive development through providing performance-based 
financial incentives for students. In particular, several recent studies have focused on the effects 
of providing cash incentives linked directly to the test scores and course performance of K-12 
and post-secondary students in developed nations (e.g., Angrist and Lavy 2008, Angrist, Lang, 
and Oreopolous 2009, Bettinger 2009, Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw, forthcoming, 
and Richburg-Hayes et al. 2009). In developing countries, the proliferation of “conditional cash 
transfer” (CCT) programs has provided family-based financial incentives for school attendance 
and the utilization of social services (e.g., Handa and Davis 2006). 
However, Wisconsin’s seminal Learnfare program - a welfare-waiver reform that 
sanctioned a family’s welfare grant when covered teens failed to meet school attendance targets - 
provides a distinctive contrast to conventional cash-incentive policies.
1 For example, like CCT 
programs (e.g., Mexico’s PROGRESA), Learnfare linked a family-based grant to meeting 
attendance targets. But Learnfare could be termed a “conditional cash penalty” (CCP) program in 
that it reduces an extant welfare grant for failure to meet program requirements. Because of the 
evidence that people exhibit an asymmetric aversion to income losses relative to a reference 
point  (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), this aspect of Learnfare may amplify its behavioral 
effects.  
Notably, Learnfare also differs from other recently studied incentive programs in 
developed countries by leveraging family involvement instead of directly targeting students with 
                                                 
1 Learnfare, which began over two decades ago, has been enormously influential in shaping other state policies. 
Thirty-eight states currently take advantage of the flexibility created by the 1996 Federal welfare reforms to craft 
similar policies that link school attendance and welfare receipt (Education Commission of the States, 2007).   2
cash incentives. At least one other design feature of Learnfare is particularly noteworthy. The 
psychological literature on the use of extrinsic rewards in education suggests that they can be 
ineffective or even harmful when students feel they lack the capacity to meet the stated 
requirements. However, Learnfare targets outcomes that are likely to be viewed as comparatively 
attainable but still economically and educationally meaningful (i.e., school attendance rather than 
achievement targets).  
Despite these unique and compelling design features, a 10-county random-assignment 
evaluation of Wisconsin’s Learnfare program suggested that it had at best modest and short-term 
effects on its targeted enrollment and attendance outcomes (Frye and Caspar 1997). In this study, 
I re-examine the data from that random-assignment study. In particular, I exploit panel-based 
econometric specifications based on pooling the available enrollment and attendance data from 
the six-semester study period. These specifications increase the statistical precision of the 
estimated treatment effects. Furthermore, they provide a unified framework for assessing the 
impact of study attrition and the quality of the random assignment results. This research design 
also provides a framework for formal hypothesis tests related to the dynamic treatment effects of 
Learnfare assignment (i.e., distinguishing short and long-term effects). 
The results of this analysis indicate that, in Milwaukee County, the county-based random-
assignment procedures did not produce balanced baseline traits. In particular, black teens in 
Milwaukee County were significantly less likely to be subjected to Learnfare’s requirements. 
Furthermore, legal challenges weakened the Learnfare requirements in this county while 
logistical challenges related to the accurate tracking of attendance data made the program 
comparatively slow and capricious. For these reasons, this analysis focuses largely on the nine 
remaining counties that participated in the study where the program implementation was 
relatively good and the random-assignment procedures appear to have performed well. 
The results based on these counties indicate that random assignment to the Learnfare 
restrictions generated statistically significant improvements in both school enrollment (3.7 
percent increase, effect size = 0.08) and school attendance (4.5 percent increase, effect size = 
0.10). Attrition from the study compromises the statistical power of inferences about the longer-
term effects of this random assignment. However, the hypothesis that these treatment effects 
were the same throughout the study period cannot be rejected, even in models that allow for 
alternative methods of imputing missing outcome data. Furthermore, the estimated treatment   3
effects of Learnfare were particularly large for at-risk subgroups. For example, Learnfare 
increased the enrollment of teens identified as baseline dropouts by 25 percent. This study 
concludes with a discussion of the unique policy design and implementation lessons from 
Wisconsin’s experience with Learnfare. 
 
2 - Financial Incentives for Students 
The notion that financial incentives will influence behavior in the expected directions is 
commonplace in economics. In contrast, an extensive literature in psychology (Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan 2001) that began with a classic laboratory experiment by Deci (1971), suggests that 
extrinsic rewards in education can substantially undermine student performance by decreasing 
their  intrinsic interest in the targeted tasks.
2 However, Cameron (2001) argues that this 
interpretation conflates the heterogeneous effects of extrinsic rewards for individuals with high 
and low levels of initial intrinsic motivation. When students lack intrinsic motivation, external 
incentives can improve academic outcomes (Cameron and Pierce 2002). However, for students 
who already possess intrinsic motivation, there is evidence that external rewards can be harmful. 
In a review of this literature, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) also underscore the importance of 
whether the task targeted with financial incentives is “effort responsive.” With regard to both of 
these concerns, Learnfare would appear to be well designed. Because Learnfare applies only to 
economically disadvantaged families (i.e., those receiving welfare), it may target teens with 
comparatively low baseline levels of intrinsic motivation. And, because Learnfare is linked to 
school attendance and not academic performance, most covered teens should feel comparatively 
capable of avoiding the financial penalties.  
A surprisingly large number of recent random-assignment evaluations have examined the 
effects of extrinsic education-related awards in field settings. Perhaps, the most well-known of 
these program evaluations involves Mexico’s seminal conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, 
which was originally called PROGRESA. This program, which has been replicated in multiple 
countries, provided cash payments to parents every two months conditional on children meeting 
school attendance goals. Evaluations of this program found that it generated significant 
improvements in school enrollment as well as other outcomes (e.g., Skoufias and McClafferty 
                                                 
2 Writing from an economics perspective, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) explicate the determinants of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation in a principal-agent model where agents infer information about themselves and the task at hand 
from principal’s provision of encouragement and rewards (i.e., the “looking-glass self”).   4
2001). In a random-assignment study conducted in Kenya, Kremer et al. (2004) provided 
financial awards (i.e., cash grants and school fees) to adolescent girls who met test-score targets. 
This treatment increased test scores by 0.15 standard deviations and exhibited program 
externalities in that it also increased the academic performance of boys (who were ineligible) and 
girls with low baseline scores (who were unlikely to earn rewards). 
Several of the studies conducted in developed nations have focused on postsecondary 
students. For example, Angrist, Lang, and Oreopolous (2009) evaluated the direct and interactive 
effects of financial rewards linked to GPA performance and academic support services for first-
year students at a large Canadian university. The financial rewards, particularly in combination 
with the offer of support services, improved the performance of female students but not male 
students. Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (forthcoming) evaluated the effect of 
providing cash rewards of different sizes to students at the University of Amsterdam who 
completed their first-year credit requirements. They found that these rewards improved the 
performance of students whose measured performance in high school mathematics was high but 
lowered the performance of students whose prior mathematics achievement was weaker, an 
effect interpreted as consistent with the degradation of intrinsic motivation. A third random 
assignment, post-secondary study (Richburg-Hayes et al. 2009) evaluated the effects of 
providing financial rewards to parents planning to attend or already attending a community 
college in Louisiana. These financial incentives, which were linked to enrollment and GPA 
targets, improved the number of credits earned, longer-term college persistence as well as 
measures of motivation. 
Two other recent random-assignment studies in developed countries evaluated the effects 
of financial incentives at elementary and secondary levels. Angrist and Lavy (2008) examine the 
effects of a school-level policy providing cash incentives for Israeli students to complete a 
matriculation certificate required for post-secondary schooling. The results of this cluster-
randomized trial indicate that cash incentives increased the performance of girls but had no 
effects on boys. Bettinger (2009) presents an evaluation of cash incentives linked to performance 
on standardized tests for elementary-school students in a low-income section of eastern Ohio. 
These incentives increased scores in mathematics (effect size = 0.15) and did not lower measures 
of intrinsic motivation but had no detectable effects on reading, social science, and science 
scores. Similar K-12 studies (Medina 2008, Vargas 2009) are ongoing in several cities where   5
student-level financial incentives are linked to attendance, behavior, and academic performance 
(Washington, DC), test scores (New York City), and grades alone (Chicago).  
In addition to these recent studies, six other random-assignment studies evaluated 
programs that, like Learnfare, linked the threat of financial sanctions to school attendance. 
Campbell and Wright (2005) argue that two of these programs (Maryland’s Primary Prevention 
Initiative and Delaware’s A Better Chance program) particularly resembled Wisconsin’s seminal 
Learnfare program in that they targeted teen welfare recipients and relied primarily on the threat 
of sanctions rather than an expansion of case-management or support services. These two 
programs appeared to have negligible effects on school enrollment and attendance (Stoker and 
Wilson 1998, Fein et al. 2001). The four other programs (i.e., the Teenage Parent Demonstration 
Program, Ohio’s Learning, Earning, and Parenting Program, California’s Cal-Learn 
Demonstration Project, and San Diego County’s School Attendance Demonstration Project) 
largely targeted teen parents on welfare and blended the threat of sanctions with program 
features such as intensive case management, support services and financial bonuses for 
performance. Evaluations of these initiatives suggest that they did increase school enrollment 
and, to a lesser extent, attendance (Maynard 1993, Bos and Fellerath 1997, Mauldon et al. 2000, 
and Jones et al. 2002). However, Campbell and Wright (2005) suggest that these comparative 
results imply that financial sanctions are less likely to be effective when used in isolation from 
related services and case management. 
Taken as a whole, the field-experimental literature on extrinsic rewards in education 
provides virtually no evidence that such policies have unintended negative consequences, 
contradicting the concerns that have dominated the lab-experimental literature from psychology. 
However, the evidence that extrinsic rewards and penalties are consistently effective in 
promoting targeted outcomes is decidedly mixed. This pattern of robust treatment effects and 
null findings suggests that program-design details, implementation quality and participant 
targeting are important policy parameters. In the next section, I describe Wisconsin’s seminal 
Learnfare program in more detail. 
 
3 - Wisconsin’s Learnfare Program 
In mid 1980s, the state of Wisconsin was in the vanguard of states that utilized increased 
Federal flexibility (i.e. waivers) to experiment with the design and implementation of its welfare   6
programs. Wisconsin’s “first wave” of waiver demonstrations both reduced the work 
disincentives for welfare recipients and expanded existing job-search and training requirements 
to the mothers of pre-school children. However, the “centerpiece of the first round of Wisconsin 
initiatives” (Wiseman 1996) was the new Learnfare policy that linked welfare receipt to the 
school attendance of covered teens. The philosophical motivation for these changes was rooted 
in an interpretation of social-contract theory (e.g., Mead 1986) which argues that the receipt of 
welfare creates an implicit obligation for the recipient to undertake activities (e.g., employment, 
job training, and school attendance) that can break cycles of economic dependency. Learnfare 
required that teens in families receiving welfare, including teen parents, attend school regularly if 
they had not graduated from high school or completed an equivalency degree. Specifically, 
school attendance records were reviewed upon initial application for welfare and twice a year 
thereafter. Teens who were not enrolled in school (and who had not graduated from high school, 
completed an equivalency degree or shown good cause) were removed from their family’s 
welfare grant until school enrollment was established.  
If a review indicated that an enrolled teen had 10 or more unexcused full-day absences in 
a semester, they were designated as having poor attendance and were subjected to monthly 
monitoring. Families on monthly monitoring received monthly notices that reminded them of 
Learnfare’s attendance requirement and offered services designed to assist with school-
attendance problems.
3 However, when monthly monitoring indicated that a student had more 
than 2 unexcused, full-day absences in a month, the family was informed that it would face a 1- 
month benefit sanction unless it could show good cause for the absences. The amount of the 
sanction depended on the family’s status. For example, the sanction for a single-parent with two 
children would be approximately $80 per month while, for a teen parent living alone, the 
sanction would be $190 (Quinn and Magill 1994). According to Frye and Caspar (1997), these 
sanction amounts 2 generally ranged from $60 to $190. 
The actual application of sanctions appears to have been relatively infrequent. For 
example, in the 10-county random assignment evaluation that is the focus of this study, 26 
percent of the teens assigned to Learnfare were subjected to monthly monitoring at least once 
                                                 
3 However, Wisconsin secured a waiver from Federal requirements for assessment and identification of supportive 
services prior to sanctioning. Wisconsin was also exempted from Federal requirements for a “conciliatory 
procedure” to resolve disputes prior to sanctioning, though a 1990 court decision restored some “due process” 
requirements (Quinn and Magill 1994).   7
during their first four semesters and only 9 percent were ever sanctioned. In the typical semester, 
the sanction rate among Learnfare teens was less than 5 percent (Frye and Caspar 1997, page 
18). Given the relatively modest sanction rate, it is not surprising that assignment to the 
Learnfare treatment did not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood or magnitude 
of AFDC receipt.  
Learnfare was implemented for teen parents and 13-14 year olds in March of 1988 and 
extended to all covered teens by September 1988 (Etheridge and Perry 1993). Governor Tommy 
Thompson advocated the early implementation of Learnfare. Wisconsin’s early experience with 
Learnfare was characterized as an “administrative disaster” (Wiseman 1996) because of the 
difficulties of establishing new, reliable and accurate links between schools and welfare offices 
for attendance monitoring. While the quality of Learnfare monitoring had largely improved 
throughout the state by the time of the random-assignment evaluation, Milwaukee County is a 
notable exception. This county contains both the largest school district in the state (Milwaukee 
Public Schools) and roughly 50 percent of the state’s Learnfare-eligible population (Frye and 
Caspar 1997). 
Milwaukee County effectively had a separate set of Learnfare procedures that included an 
additional attendance verification check that delayed the time that lapsed between attendance 
violations and benefit sanctions. This procedure was adopted in 1992 as a part of a settlement to 
a lawsuit (Kronquist v. Whitburn), which alleged that Learnfare procedures violated due process 
because of the exceptionally poor quality of the attendance data in Milwaukee County schools. 
These procedures created an “appreciably longer” time between poor attendance and a sanction 
(Frye and Caspar 1997). Outside of Milwaukee County, poor attendance could trigger a 
processed sanction in as little as 2 months. In Milwaukee County, the lapsed time to a sanction 
would be at least twice as long.  
Furthermore, as a practical matter, a 1995 review found that the average time between 
poor attendance and the resulting sanction was actually 6.6 months in Milwaukee Public Schools 
(Frye and Caspar 1997). This review also found that poor data quality and processing errors in 
Milwaukee Public Schools led to false negatives: the absence of sanctions in situations when the 
school attendance of covered teens failed to meet Learnfare standards. Because of these 
concerns, both the primary analysis of Learnfare’s experimental evaluation and this re-analysis 
treat Milwaukee County separately from the other participating counties.   8
4 - A Random-Assignment Learnfare Evaluation 
The Federal waivers that allowed Wisconsin to introduce a policy like Learnfare also 
required that comprehensive evaluations were conducted. An early non-experimental evaluation 
based on administrative data from six school districts prior to and after the introduction of 
Learnfare (Pawasarat, Quinn, and Stetzer 1992) found no evidence that Learnfare improved 
school attendance. The quality of these inferences was hotly debated by state officials and the 
evaluation team (Quinn and Magill 1994) Nonetheless, the report in question acknowledged 
itself that “Given the limitations of the control group populations and problems of identifying 
AFDC and non-AFDC teen parents, the Learnfare hypothesis testing lacks the strength of an 
experimental design using random assignment.” However, a subsequent evaluation (Frye and 
Caspar 1997), which did utilize random assignment, indicated that the Learnfare program had at 
most short-term school-participation effects for certain sub-groups (Education Week, 1997). That 
random-assignment evaluation is the focus of the re-analysis presented here. 
4.1 Study Design 
The random-assignment evaluation of Learnfare was based on data from 10 counties. 
These 10 counties were chosen from Wisconsin’s 72 counties by a procedure that sought both 
representativeness of the statewide Learnfare population and a balance of other programmatic 
concerns. Specifically, counties with fewer than 125 Learnfare teenagers were excluded from 
consideration because of the impracticality of monitoring attendance for small numbers of 
welfare recipients (Frye, Caspar, and Merrill 1992). Other counties (with the exception of 
Milwaukee County) were excluded because they were participating in a contemporaneous 
evaluation of the Parental and Family Responsibility program, which influenced the incentives of 
teen mothers receiving welfare to marry and abstain from having further children (Hoynes 1997, 
page 133). These exclusions left 29 counties as potential participants in the Learnfare evaluation.  
Ten counties were randomly selected from this pool with probabilities proportional to 
their share of the statewide Learnfare population (Milwaukee, Brown, Douglas, Eau Claire, 
Kenosha, La Crosse, Marathon, Marinette, Portage, and Racine). However, stratification insured 
the participation of 3 rural counties (i.e., Marathon, Portage, and Marinette). Between March of 
1993 and April of 1994, 3,205 teenagers from these 10 counties were selected for the study. 
Selection into the study occurred at the time when a teenager was scheduled to be introduced to 
Learnfare. This usually occurred when a member of an ongoing AFDC case turned 13 or when a   9
new AFDC case opened.
4 Study participants had to meet the basic requirements for the Learnfare 
program: aged 13 to 19, either a parent or living with natural or adoptive parents, and having 
neither graduated from high school nor completed an equivalency degree.  Teens with a sibling 
who had been on the AFDC case and aged 13 to 19 during the previous 12 months were 
excluded from the study (Frye, Caspar, and Merrill 1992).  
Once baseline data had been collected and a teen had been determined as eligible for the 
study, they were randomly assigned a treatment status. A statewide specialist was available to 
review the eligibility determination and to conduct the random assignment. However, another 
option was for county staff to make these designations (Frye, Caspar, and Merrill 1992). Teens 
assigned to the treatment received the usual introduction to Learnfare and were subject to its 
sanctions. Those assigned to the control group were not introduced to Learnfare and were 
exempted from its restrictions for the duration of the study.
5 
4.2 Outcome Measures 
For each study participant, school enrollment and attendance data were collected over a 
six-semester study period (i.e., spring 1993 through fall 1995). Both the original analysis and this 
study’s re-analysis focus on 3 distinct school enrollment and attendance measures. First, school 
enrollment is measured by the number of months in the semester for which a student’s 
enrollment was verified. This measure varies from 0 to 4.5 in increments of 0.5. Second, the 
attendance rate identifies the fraction of school days in the teen’s school district for which the 
student was in attendance. A third measure identifies the fraction of school days for which the 
student had an unexcused full-day absence. These last two measures are not fully symmetrical 
because of excused student absences. Identifying the comparative effects of Learnfare on the 
attendance rate and the rate of unexcused absences provides a direct way to assess whether 
Learnfare generated genuine increases in attendance or merely increased the use of excused 
absences. For the full student-by-semester sample, the mean value of the months-enrolled 
                                                 
4 A teenager who had not previously been participating in Learnfare could also enter the study upon moving to the 
home of a parent receiving welfare support. 
5 One potential issue with welfare demonstrations of this sort is that their limited duration may bias the inferences 
towards finding no effect by weakening the treatment contrast (e.g., Hoynes 1997). However, in this instance, the 
study window of four to six semesters covers a substantial portion of the period during which Learnfare would be 
binding for an AFDC recipient.   10
measure is 3.4 (SD = 1.68). The mean attendance rate is 0.687 (SD = 0.352) while the mean rate 
of unexcused absences is 0.257 (SD = 0.366).
6  
Table 1 illustrates the basic panel structure of the available data by showing the number 
of study participants by month of entry and the number of subjects with valid attendance data by 
each of the six available semesters. This table also suggests the extent of attrition from the 
sample used in the original analysis (i.e., observations of attendance data). In the absence of 
attrition, we would expect to see 3,205 observations for each of the last four study semesters. 
However, the number of observations with attendance data drops from 2,833 in the spring of 
1994 to 2,070 in the fall of 1995. That is, by the last semester of the study, attendance data were 
not available for over a third of the study participants.  
This attrition is due in large part to the difficulty of tracking study participants who 
moved. The absence of outcome data for some study participants could compromise both the 
internal and the external validity of the impact analysis. For example, the estimated effect of 
Learnfare on the enrollment and attendance measures would be biased upwards if study 
participants who were assigned to the treatment but unlikely to meet Learnfare’s restrictions 
were more likely to move away.
7  
However, there was also an unconventional dimension to the missingness of some 
outcome data in the original Learnfare analysis. The enrollment and attendance data are not 
defined for study participants who completed high school or a GED equivalency. Most of the 
study participants (i.e., slightly more than half) were only 13 years old when they entered the 
study so they did not have sufficient time for the typical period of high school completion during 
the study window.
8 Therefore, this study cannot provide a strong test of whether the Learnfare 
restrictions improved the probability of completing high school. 
Nonetheless, inferences based on the preferred specifications applied to the data outside 
Milwaukee County suggest that random assignment to the Learnfare restrictions had a positive, 
though not quite statistically significant (p-value = 0.122), effect on high school completion. 
This pattern of positive treatment effects implies that the primary evaluation’s approach of 
                                                 
6 While most of the analysis presented here utilizes these measures, the results based on several alternative outcome 
measures (e.g., binary indicators for no enrollment, full-time enrollment, no unexcused absences, etc.) are also 
presented. 
7 Because Learnfare was in place statewide during the evaluation, only an out-of-state relocation could circumvent 
its restrictions. 
8 Only 5.1 percent of the student-by-semester observations were identified as high school completers.   11
eliminating high school completers from the enrollment and attendance analysis biases the 
estimated treatment effect downward. The attrition of high-school completers from the original 
analysis may particularly complete identifying the longer-term effects of Learnfare (e.g., four 
semesters after random assignment).  
This study presents new evidence on the determinants of attrition from the Learnfare 
evaluation and, in particular, on the effects of random-assignment status. The empirical 
relevance of study attrition is also examined by presenting impact estimates based on several 
alternative procedures for imputing the missing outcome data. 
4.3 Replicating Frye and Caspar (1997) 
Before moving to an independent analysis of the Learnfare data, this section establishes 
an important baseline by describing and replicating the key evaluation results reported by Frye 
and Caspar (1997). This primary evaluation estimated the effects of random assignment to 
Learnfare on the 3 enrollment and attendance measures (i.e., months enrolled, rate of attendance, 
rate of unexcused absences) using separate cross-sections of study participants defined by 
whether they were in their first, second, third, or fourth study semester. So, for example, the 
“first-semester” results are based on pooling outcome data from the spring 1993, fall 1993 and 
spring 1994 semesters. 
I report regression results based on the same sample selection and a similar regression 
specification in Table 2. These results are similar to those reported by Frye and Caspar (1997, 
Table 14).
9. For the study participants from Milwaukee County, random assignment to Learnfare 
appears to have had small and statistically insignificant effects on enrollment and attendance 
across all 3 outcome measures and regardless of the length of time in the study.
10 Outside of 
Milwaukee County, where the randomization procedures appear to have performed well, 
Learnfare appears to have generated significant increases in enrollment and attendance (e.g., a 3 
percentage-point increase in attendance) but only in either the first or second semester. 
This apparent lack of persistent treatment effects is the basis for the widespread view that 
Learnfare did not have meaningful effects on its targeted outcomes. However, this interpretation 
                                                 
9 The sample sizes match exactly for all 24 subgroups. However, the estimated treatment effects reported here differ 
slightly because of modest differences in the regression controls. For example, the results in Table 2 condition on 
unrestrictive county and semester fixed effects. 
10 The fourth-semester enrollment result for Milwaukee County suggests that Learnfare reduced enrollment. This 
weakly significant effect suggests the harmful effects of cash incentives on intrinsic motivation. However, the poor 
treatment-control balance for the study participants from Milwaukee County suggests that these inferences lack 
internal validity.   12
may be inaccurate for a number of reasons. First, an analysis based on the cross-sections in Table 
2 fails to exploit the statistical precision made available by the panel structure of the available 
study data. Second, a panel-data approach to this analysis would also provide a framework for 
explicit tests of whether the treatment effects have statistically significant differences across 
semesters.  
Third, while it is true that the estimated treatment effects appear to decline with the 
length of time in the study, these longer-term effects are also estimated with comparatively less 
precision because study attrition from the study substantially reduces the number of observations 
observed for multiple semesters. And the lack of precision associated with longer-term effects 
may be meaningful. For example, the 95-percent confidence intervals for the fourth-semester 
treatment effects for each of the 3 outcome variables include the corresponding first-semester 
point estimate. Statistical tests based on the pooled data can indicate more formally whether the 
data reject the hypothesis of a common treatment effect across the length of time in the study.  
 
5 – Treatment-Control Balance 
The fundamental rationale for using random assignment to choose the Learnfare status of 
these study participants was to break the correlation that might otherwise exist between the 
determinants of the outcomes under study and assignment to Learnfare. However, it is possible 
(though unlikely) that, merely by chance, random assignment failed to balance the observed and 
unobserved traits of study participants across the treatment and control conditions. Furthermore, 
in the Learnfare evaluation, county officials (as opposed to a trained state officer) had the 
autonomy to conduct the random assignment by themselves (Caspar, Frye, and Merrill 1992). 
This potential decentralization of the random assignment process suggests the possibility that the 
fidelity of the procedures could have been inconsistent or even subject to some discretion. 
A straightforward way to assess the quality of the random-assignment results is to 
examine whether the observed baseline traits appear to differ across those assigned to the 
treatment and control groups. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on nine baseline traits of the 
3,205 study participants, separately for Milwaukee County and the other nine counties and by 
treatment status. These measures include binary indicators for sex, race, and ethnicity. They also 
include age measured in years and binary indicators for being “over age” for their grade (e.g., 
15+ years old while in grade 8, 16+ years old while in grade 9, etc.), a teen parent, and a school   13
dropout. Nearly 80 percent of the participating teens from Milwaukee County were Black or 
Hispanic while under 4 percent were Asian. In the other nine counties, over 13 percent of the 
participants were Asian and just under 25 percent were Black or Hispanic. However, the 
remaining baseline traits were relatively similar across Milwaukee County and the remaining 
counties. For example, 15 to 17 percent of participants were defined as school dropouts when 
they entered the study. And 17 to 19 percent of participants were identified as teen parents at 
baseline. 
Table 2 also presents the probability values from t tests of treatment-control comparisons 
for each baseline trait. The results for Milwaukee County indicate that black participants were 
significantly less likely to be subjected to Learnfare’s restrictions (p-value = 0.0021) while 
Hispanics were significantly more likely (p-value = 0.0103). Furthermore, within Milwaukee 
County, there were weakly significant differences in the likelihood of being “over age” and a 
teen parent across the treatment and control conditions. Specifically, both those who were over 
age and those who were teen parents were more likely to be exempted from Learnfare’s 
restrictions. 
The evidence from these “multiple comparisons” may be misleading simply because, 
even when the null hypotheses of no treatment-control differences are all true, we could expect 
to make some Type I errors.
11 The procedure developed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) 
provides a powerful way to adjust for the false discovery rate (FDR) associated with such 
multiple comparisons. Table 2 reports the p-values based on this correction.
12 These results 
indicate that the imbalance of Black and Hispanic study participants across the treatment and 
control conditions is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, the imbalances 
associated with study participants who were over age or teen parents at baseline are no longer 
statistically significant. 
In contrast to the results for Milwaukee County, the baseline traits of the study 
participants in the nine other counties appear to be consistently well balanced across the 
                                                 
11 See Schochet (2008) for a discussion of the multiple-comparisons problem in the context of educational 
interventions. 
12 The p-values for the nine hypothesis tests are ordered from smallest to largest (i.e., p1 < p2 < … < p9) and each 
conventional p-value is inflated by a factor equal to the rank of the original p-value divided by the number of 
comparisons conducted. Interestingly, the adjusted p-value for the treatment-control comparison of Blacks is 
equivalent under both the Benjamini-Hochberg correction and the less powerful Bonferroni correction (i.e., 0.0021 x 
9 = 0.0189). However, the imbalance of Hispanic study participants would only be weakly significant under a 
Bonferroni correction (i.e., 0.0103 x 9 = 0.0927).   14
treatment and control conditions. Auxiliary regressions that model treatment status as a function 
of all of these baseline traits imply similar results. Within Milwaukee County, such regressions 
suggest that teen-parent status has a particularly robust negative effect on being assigned to 
Learnfare. However, outside of Milwaukee County, these baseline traits are neither individual 
nor jointly significant determinants of treatment status. 
One candidate explanation for the treatment-control imbalance observed in 
Milwaukee County is that it simply occurred by chance (i.e., an unintended randomization 
“failure”). Another possibility is that this pattern reflects discretion on the part of the state or 
county officers who identified each participant’s treatment assignment.  More specifically, in 
order to protect study participants who were thought to be particularly likely to face Learnfare 
sanctions, officials in Milwaukee County may have been more likely to designate them as being 
in the control group which was not subject to potential sanctions. 
However, both the source of this non-random assignment and the direction of the implied 
bias in the estimated treatment effects for participants from Milwaukee County are unknown. To 
examine the effects of the Learnfare restrictions in an unbiased manner, the remaining analysis 
will focus on the nine other counties where the treatment-control balance suggests that the 
random assignment procedures worked well. An additional rationale for this focus is the 
evidence that the Learnfare sanctions were implemented with substantially higher fidelity (i.e., 
more quickly and accurately) outside of Milwaukee County. Nonetheless, the potential policy 
lessons from Milwaukee County’s experience with Learnfare (e.g., the role of data systems in 
effective implementation) should not be dismissed and are underscored in the concluding 
discussion of this study. 
 
6 - Study Attrition 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the nine-county, student-by-semester panel data. 
The number of potential panel observations from the 1,183 study participants outside of 
Milwaukee County is 6,028. However, study attrition implies that attendance data are missing for 
over 22 percent of these observations. This attrition, which was not comprehensively addressed 
in the original Learnfare analysis, constitutes a potential threat to both internal and external 
validity. A straightforward way to examine the study attrition is to model an attrition indicator,   15
Aicms, as a function of treatment assignment, Ti, and other baseline observables, Xi. A generalized 
panel-based specification for these auxiliary regressions takes the following form: 
icms s m c i i icms X T A ε δ θ η β γ α + + + + + + =      ( 1 )  
where ηc, θm, and δs respectively represent county, entry month and semester fixed effects and ε 
represents a mean-zero error term for teen i in county c who entered the study in the month-year 
combination a and is observed in semester s.
13 A second version of equation (1) conditions on 
fully general interactions between the county, entry-month, and semester fixed effects. This 
specification allows for entry-cohort fixed effects specific to each county (i.e., ηs x θm), fixed 
effects specific to a county in a particular semester (i.e., ηc x δs) and fixed effects related to the 
length of time in the study (i.e., θm x δs). 
  The results based on estimates of equation (1) indicate that attrition is significantly more 
likely among Hispanics, older teens, and teen parents (and less likely among Asians). The 
attrition of these subgroups compromises the generalizability of the Learnfare evaluation. 
However, a more central concern is whether random assignment to Learnfare increased the 
likelihood of attrition. The first two columns of Table 5 report the estimated effects of the 
treatment assignment on the probability of attrition, both for the full sample and for models 
based on several subgroups. The results indicate that assignment to Learnfare had a positive but 
small and statistically insignificant effect on attrition in the full sample. 
  Furthermore, random assignment to Learnfare’s restrictions did not have a statistically 
significant effect on study attrition among most subgroups. However, one notable exception 
involves those who were teen parents at baseline. For this subgroup, assignment to Learnfare 
increased the probability of study attrition by nearly 10 percentage points. 
  Because of both the large amount of study attrition and the limited evidence that attrition 
was influenced by treatment status, some of the results presented in this re-analysis rely on 
imputations for missing outcome data. One basic and uncontroversial imputation is to define 
enrollment and attendance outcomes for those who have met Learnfare’s requirements by 
completing high school or a GED equivalency. Specifically, in some models, high-school 
                                                 
13 The standard errors in this specification are adjusted for heteroscedasticity clustered at the county/entry-month 
level. This approach appears to generate the most conservatively large measures of precision relative to several 
sensible alternatives (e.g., classical and robust standard errors as well as standard errors clustered at either the 
individual, county, entry month, semester, semester/entry-month, or county/semester levels). Clustering based on 
county/entry-month cells also implies a fairly large number of clusters (i.e., 9×14 = 126), so the finite-sample bias in 
such cluster adjustments (Angrist and Pischke 2009) is unlikely to be a concern.   16
graduates are identified as fully enrolled and in attendance rather than missing. This simple 
imputation reduces the attrition rate from 22.1 percent to 16.6 percent (Table 4). The estimated 
effects of treatment status on this alternative attrition measure (i.e., columns (3) and (4) of Table 
5) are similar. In particular, teen parents assigned to Learnfare’s restrictions were significantly 
more likely to leave the study. 
  This study also utilizes three alternative imputation procedures for the remaining 
outcome measures that are missing: “last observation carry forward” (LOCF) imputation, worst-
case imputation, and multiple imputation. The LOCF procedure, which is the most commonly 
used imputation procedure in medical trials with repeated outcome measures (Wood, White, and 
Thompson 2004), simply imputes to missing outcomes the last recorded measure for the given 
individual.
14 Applying a LOCF imputation to the Learnfare data reduces the attrition rate to 4.2 
percent (Table 4). The attrition that remains following the LOCF imputation reflects study 
participants for whom outcome data were never observed. Auxiliary regressions indicate that 
treatment status does not have a statistically significant effect on this post-LOCF attrition 
measure (i.e., columns (5) and (6) in Table 5). In particular, in models that allow for interactions 
between the county, semester and entry-month fixed effects, treatment status has no statistically 
significant effect on attrition either for the full sample or for any of the subgroups. 
  The results from column (6) in Table 5 suggest that attrition is unlikely to confound the 
impact analyses based on the LOCF imputation. However, the robustness of the results based on 
this approach is examined by utilizing two other imputation procedures (i.e., worst-case 
imputation and multiple imputation) that allow for an analysis based on the full set of 6,028 
potential panel observations.  
Under worst case imputation all missing outcome data are assumed to reflect school 
dropouts (i.e., no enrollment or attendance). One of the drawbacks of both the LOCF and worst-
case imputations is that the resulting standard errors may be misleading because the imputed 
outcome measures, which are constant, understate the true variation in the dependent variables. 
The time-invariant nature of these imputations may also be misleading with respect to 
distinguishing short and long-term treatment effects.  
                                                 
14 This approach has also been used in the econometric analyses of data from the Project STAR class-size 
experiment (Krueger 1999, Dee 2004). For ease of interpretation, the LOCF imputation used here is based on the 
cardinal value of the enrollment and attendance measures. However, LOCF imputations based on the percentile rank 
of these measures (i.e., preserving the rank position of attriters in each outcome distribution) return similar results.   17
Multiple imputation (Rubin 1987) addresses both of these concerns. The multiple 
imputation (MI) technique is a Monte Carlo procedure in which all missing values of the 
outcome measures are imputed by the predicted values from regressions fitted to the observed 
data and combined with a randomly generated error term. Multiple versions of complete data sets 
are generated in this fashion and the estimated coefficients are the means of the estimates based 
on these data sets.
15 While the impact of study attrition cannot be definitively addressed, the 
comparative results from the LOCF, worst-case and multiple-imputation procedures should 
suggest the extent to which study attrition is a confounding source of either bias or imprecision. 
 
6 - Impact Estimates 
The basic econometric specification applied to the pooled nine-county data from the 
Learnfare evaluation takes the following form:  
icms s m c i i icms X T Y ε δ θ η β γ α + + + + + + =      ( 2 )  
As in the attrition analysis, some results are based on specifications that introduce unrestrictive 
interactions between the county, entry month and semester fixed effects (i.e., ηs x θm, ηc x δs and 
θm x δs).  
6.1 Baseline Results 
Table 6 reports the estimated γ from versions of equation (2) applied to each of the three 
outcome measures and using both the observed data and data based on different imputation 
procedures. These results consistently indicate that random assignment to the Learnfare program 
generated statistically significant increases in enrollment and attendance. In the preferred 
specifications, which condition on interacts between the fixed effects and impute data for those 
who have completed high school, the implied increase in months enrolled is 0.1325 while the 
increase in the attendance rate is approximately 0.0339 percentage points.  
The treatment-induced increase in enrollment is equivalent to 3.7 percent of the control-
group mean and 0.083 of the control-group standard deviation. The increase in the rate of 
attendance is 4.5 percent of the control group mean (and 0.101 of a standard deviation). 
                                                 
15 Rubin (1987) shows that, for the amount of data missing in this context, there is little efficiency gain to 
conducting more than 5 to 10 imputations. The results reported here are based on 10 imputations. The standard 
errors based on this procedure adjust for the within-imputation variance, the between-imputation variance and the 
number of imputations.   18
Alternatively, these full-sample treatment estimates imply approximately 3 additional days of 
enrollment and attendance per semester.
16  
Another compelling way to interpret these treatment estimates, which circumvents the 
methodological issues surrounding effect-size calculations, is to compare them to policy-relevant 
achievement gaps. For example, the estimates from equation (2) indicate that being a dropout at 
baseline implies an enrollment outcome that is 1.02 lower (t-statistic = -6.95) and an attendance 
rate that is 0.2610 lower (t-statistic = -7.69). The improvements implied by Learnfare’s full-
sample treatment effects are equivalent to 13 percent of these enrollment and attendance gaps. 
Alternatively, the enrollment measure is 0.1632 higher for females than for males (t-statistic = 
2.85). The treatment effect implied by Learnfare equals 81 percent of this gender gap. And those 
who are “over age” for their grade have an attendance rate that is 0.0722 lower (t-statistic = -
2.81). The increase in school attendance implied by Learnfare is equal to 47 percent of this gap. 
Interestingly, the Learnfare effects on the rate of unexcused absences and the attendance 
rate are quite symmetrical, which suggests that Learnfare did not merely increase the number of 
absences that were excused. Furthermore, the impact estimates based on alternative imputation 
procedures are quite similar. However, ignoring the attrition of study participants who had 
actually met Learnfare’s requirements by completing high school does imply a notable 
downward bias in the estimated impact of Learnfare on school-attendance rates (i.e., a one-third 
reduction in the estimated γ). 
Table 7 identifies, for each of the three outcome measures, how the estimated effects of 
Learnfare evolved by participants’ length of time in the study. More specifically, the indicator 
for random assignment to the Learnfare treatment is interacted with binary indicators for whether 
the participant is in their first through sixth semester of study participation. All of these 
specifications condition on interactions between county, entry-month and semester fixed effects. 
The results based on the observed data as well as on data sets that include imputations for high 
school graduates and the LOCF imputation are also reported. 
These results based on the observed data generally suggest that the treatment-induced 
increases in enrollment and attendance are largest in the first two semesters of study 
participation. By the fourth semester, the Learnfare treatment effects appear to have fallen 
                                                 
16 The assumption of 20 school days in a month implies that 0.1325 additional months is a 2.7 day increase. The 
assumption of 90 school days in a semester implies that a 0.039 increase in the attendance rate is 3.1 days.   19
somewhat and to have become statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, the 
conventional view that Learnfare had at most short-term effects appears to be overdrawn. The 
fourth-semester effects are generally within a fraction of the standard errors associated with the 
larger first and second-semester effects. Furthermore, even the casual appearance of decaying 
treatment effects is substantially diminished after imputing for the absence of high-school 
completers in a naïve analysis of the observed attendance and enrollment data. More directly, for 
each outcome measure and imputation method, the hypothesis that the treatment has the same 
effect by length of time in the study cannot be rejected. 
6.2 Alternative Outcome Measures 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that Learnfare generated meaningful and sustained 
increases in school enrollment and attendance. Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide visual, non-parametric 
evidence of these treatment effects by showing the kernel density estimates for each outcome 
measure by treatment status. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that, for those assigned to the treatment, the 
probability mass for these enrollment and attendance measures is concentrated in higher values. 
Similarly, Figure 3 indicates that, for those assigned to Learnfare, the rate of unexcused absences 
tend to be concentrated in the lower values. 
However, these kernel densities also illustrate that the three continuous outcome 
measures used in the original evaluation have skewed and bimodal distributions. These figures 
suggest that a more natural way to interpret the effects of Learnfare would be to identify how it 
influences the probabilities that the enrollment and attendance measures exceed particular values. 
Table 8 reports the key results of such an exercise using a preferred specification and 20 different 
binary outcome measures defined for each enrollment and attendance measure and multiple cut 
points.
17 The results indicate that Learnfare increased the probability of full-time enrollment (i.e., 
months enrolled equal to 4.5) by 4.24 percentage points (i.e., 6.6 percent of the control-group 
mean). Similarly, Learnfare increased the probability of having any enrollment for the entire 
semester (i.e., months enrolled > 0) by 3.4 percentage points (i.e., 3.9 percent of the control-
group mean). 
Though Learnfare generated consistent increases throughout the distribution of the 
enrollment variable (i.e., the extensive margin), the treatment effects with respect to the 
                                                 
17 Because study induction began in March of 1993, the months-enrolled measure for the spring 1993 semester takes 
on values of 0, 1, 2, and 3. For purposes of defining these binary outcome measures, these values are redefined as 0, 
1.5, 3.0 and 4.5, respectively.    20
attendance measures (i.e., the intensive margin) were somewhat more heterogeneous. For 
example, the attendance results indicate that Learnfare did not generate statistically significant 
increases in the probability of perfect attendance or in the probability of an attendance rate ≥ 
0.10. However, Learnfare did generate statistically significant increases in the probability of 
near-perfect attendance (i.e., attendance ≥ 0.90) as well as increases in attendance on more 
modest margins (e.g., attendance ≥ 0.50). For example, Learnfare increased the probability of 
school attendance ≥ 0.90 by 5.41 percentage points (or 11.3 percent relative to the control-group 
mean). Overall, these full-sample results indicate that Learnfare was consistently successful in 
promoting both school enrollment and high-to-moderate levels of school attendance. 
6.3 Subgroup Results 
Table 9 presents the estimated effects of Learnfare for each of the three outcome 
measures and for sub-groups of study participants defined by policy-relevant baseline traits. The 
estimated treatment effects are roughly similar for males, females, minorities (i.e., black or 
Hispanic teens), and non-minorities. However, these results also suggest that Learnfare had 
substantially larger effects for subgroups that are at particular risk of academic failure (e.g., those 
who were over age for their grade, teen parents, or school dropouts at baseline). 
  For example, Learnfare increased the months-enrolled measure for baseline dropouts by 
an amount (i.e., 0.5370). The control-group mean of the enrollment measure among baseline 
dropouts was 2.13 so this treatment effect constitutes a 25 percent increase. This estimated 
treatment effect is also nearly five times as large as the treatment effect for those enrolled at 
baseline (i.e., 0.1164). Similarly, the increased enrollment among those who were over age for 
their baseline grade (i.e., 0.4829) is nearly four times as large as the effect for those who were 
not over age (i.e., 0.1430). The treatment effects on attendance were also larger for these 
subgroups. However, because of the comparatively small size of these subgroups, these estimates 
generally had less precision. These heterogeneous treatment effects imply that Learnfare policies 
policy-relevant gaps in school persistence. For example, because Learnfare increased the 
enrollment of dropouts by 0.5370 and that of non-dropouts by 0.1164, it closed the enrollment 
gap between these two groups by 41 percent (i.e., (0.5370-0.1164)/1.02).   21
7 - Conclusions 
Wisconsin’s influential Learnfare program sanctioned the welfare benefits of families 
where covered teens did not meet school attendance requirements. The design features of 
Learnfare are distinct from other recent and ongoing initiatives to provide students with financial 
incentives for academic performance in several ways. For example, unlike the recent student-
incentive programs in developed countries, Learnfare leveraged family-based financial 
incentives to improve student outcomes (as in the conditional cash transfer programs that have 
proliferated in developing countries). Second, Learnfare provided sanctions against an existing 
transfer rather than rewards. In the presence of reference-dependent preferences (e.g., loss 
aversion), this aspect of Learnfare should amplify its behavioral impact. Third, the extant 
psychological literature suggests that, to avoid harming intrinsic motivation, financial incentives 
should be based on requirements that participants feel they have the capacity to meet (i.e., tasks 
which are “effort responsive”). Learnfare may have been particularly likely to satisfy this 
condition because it targeted attendance rather than grades or test performance. These 
psychologically informed design features suggest that Learnfare is a novel example of using 
“choice architecture” to increase the desired impact of a policy (Thaler and Susstein 2008). 
The conventional understanding of Learnfare has been that it was unsuccessful in 
influencing its targeted outcomes. However, the results presented here indicate that Learnfare 
was highly effective in improving both school enrollment and attendance. In fact, the benefits of 
Learnfare in promoting school attendance were concentrated among some of the most at-risk 
students (i.e., those who were school dropouts at baseline). The effectiveness of Learnfare 
suggests that its unique design parameters merit further scrutiny and consideration. It should be 
noted that these design features can be utilized in ways that attenuate the pejorative, normative 
consequences of sanctioning the welfare grants of economically disadvantaged youths. For 
example, the creation of a new grant or scholarship that could be subjected to performance-
related sanctions could leverage reference-dependent preferences to improve student outcomes 
without lowering overall income. 
However, another notable and important lesson from Wisconsin’s Learnfare experience 
involves the serious implementation challenges that occurred within Milwaukee County. The 
failure of the random assignment procedures within Milwaukee County to balance the baseline 
traits of study participants across the treatment and control states strongly qualifies any   22
conclusions based on the experimental evaluation that occurred there. Nonetheless, the 
comparative difficulty of producing timely and accurate attendance data within Milwaukee 
County serve as a compelling reminder that any policy linking financial incentives tied to school 
attendance is likely to require high-performance data systems that can provide quick and 
accurate feedback to students and their families. The growing sophistication of data systems in 
public schools may, therefore, provide an important complement to future policies like 
Learnfare.  
Any future consideration of Learnfare-like policies should also consider how a program 
of extrinsic rewards compares to other rigorously evaluated policy alternatives. For example, the 
“What Works Clearinghouse” maintained by the Institute of Education Sciences has identified 
other effective dropout prevention programs (e.g., ALAS, Check and Connect) that rely on 
intensive case management rather than financial incentives. The comparative desirability of such 
programs is an open question whose answer is likely to depend in part on the amount of intrinsic 
motivation that exists in the targeted population. 
However, two other highly policy-relevant criteria for comparing dropout prevention 
strategies are cost-effectiveness and scalability. With respect to both of these desiderata, 
Learnfare-like policies may provide an attractive contrast to initiatives that focus on case 
management and support services. For example, the development of a Learnfare-like policy 
implies new fixed and operating expenditures. And the Learnfare experience suggests that there 
is relatively little revenue gain from imposing sanctions, which occurred at a fairly low rate (i.e., 
typically less than 5 percent). Nonetheless, Learnfare-like initiatives are likely to be to be 
substantially more cost-effective than comparatively labor-intensive case-management programs. 
Furthermore, the evidence from the random-assignment evaluation analyzed here provides strong 
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Table 1 - Study Participants by Entry Month and Semester with Attendance Data 
          
   Study  Participants with attendance data 
Entry Month  Participants  Spring 1993  Fall 1993 Spring  1994 Fall  1994  Spring 1995  Fall 1995 
March  1993  103 96 84 80 70 61  47 
April  1993  203 187 173 158 143 136  117 
May  1993  209 197 189 174 164 153  127 
June  1993  294  -  269 248 222 208  184 
July  1993  297  -  273 256 235 230  200 
August  1993  306  -  283 264 236 222  202 
September  1993  362  -  350 319 276 260  223 
October  1993  341  -  330 312 280 258  232 
November  1993  282  -  272 263 245 231  184 
December  1993  296  -  288 274 243 230  196 
January  1994  235  -  229 227 194 182  149 
February  1994 206  - -  189  176  166  151 
March  1994  60  -  -  59 57 55  51 
April 1994  11  -  -  10  9  9  7 
          
Total  in  Study  3,205  480  2,740 2,833 2,550 2,401  2,070 
              26
 
Table 2 - Estimated Treatment Effects by County and Time in Study 
        
   Semesters Estimated  Standard  Sample
Dependent variable  in Study Effect  Error  Size 
      Milwaukee County 
Months Enrolled  1  -0.0009  0.0738  1,955 
Months Enrolled  2  -0.0600  0.0410  1,859 
Months Enrolled  3  -0.0556  0.0573  1,676 
Months Enrolled  4  -0.0904*  0.0492  1,582 
Rate of Attendance  1  0.0003  0.0123  1,930 
Rate of Attendance  2  -0.0124  0.0113  1,827 
Rate of Attendance  3  -0.0067  0.0127  1,648 
Rate of Attendance  4  -0.0204  0.0126  1,561 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  1  0.0018  0.0112  1,930 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  2  0.0109  0.0091  1,827 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  3  0.0124  0.0137  1,648 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  4  0.0197  0.0121  1,561 
    Outside Milwaukee County 
Months Enrolled  1  0.1072  0.0919  1,146 
Months Enrolled  2  0.1229*  0.0671  1,074 
Months Enrolled  3  0.0504  0.0836  949 
Months Enrolled  4  0.0037  0.0843  868 
Rate of Attendance  1  0.0292**  0.0137  1,102 
Rate of Attendance  2  0.0192  0.0134  1,024 
Rate of Attendance  3  0.0026  0.0158  925 
Rate of Attendance  4  0.0133  0.0165  846 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  1  -0.0257*  0.0133  1,102 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  2  -0.0118  0.0140  1,024 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  3  -0.0028  0.0164  925 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  4  -0.0110  0.0162  846 
Notes: These models condition on the eight baseline observables and semester 
FE. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity clustered at the 
county/entry-month level. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3 - Baseline Traits by Treatment Status and County, Learnfare Evaluation 
                 
   Milwaukee County    Other Counties 
           B-H adjusted             B-H adjusted 
Baseline trait  Treatment  Control  p-value  p-value   Treatment  Control p-value  p-value 
                 
Female  0.599 0.609  0.6509  0.6509   0.570  0.559  0.6993  0.8991 
Black  0.603 0.669  0.0021  0.0189   0.147  0.176  0.1725  0.9999 
Hispanic  0.174 0.133  0.0103  0.0464   0.080  0.086  0.6943  0.9999 
Asian  0.040 0.033  0.3804  0.6847   0.122  0.141  0.3479  0.9999 
Native  American  0.013 0.010  0.5140  0.6609   0.023  0.026  0.6926  0.9999 
Age 14.344  14.383  0.6491  0.7302    14.591  14.612  0.8580  0.9653 
Over age for grade  0.147  0.178  0.0588  0.1764    0.142  0.144  0.9055  0.9055 
Parent  0.174 0.204  0.0872  0.1962   0.163  0.176  0.5552  0.9999 
Dropout  0.157 0.170  0.4221  0.6332   0.140  0.156  0.4291  0.9999 
                  
Sample Size  1,006  1,016          614  569       
Notes: The treatment and control columns identify the mean value of the baseline trait by treatment status and county. The p-
value refers to t-test of the hypothesis that the mean value of the baseline trait is the same across treatment and control states. 
The Benjamini-Hochberg (B-H) adjusted p-values reflect an inflation factor that adjusts for false discoveries in multiple 
comparisons.   28
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics, Learnfare 9-County Panel Data 
      
      Standard  Sample 
Variable Mean  Deviation  Size 
Treatment 0.519  0.500  6,028 
Female 0.563  0.496  6,028 
Black 0.161  0.368  6,028 
Hispanic 0.083  0.275  6,028 
Asian 0.132  0.338  6,028 
Native American  0.025  0.156  6,028 
Age 14.62  1.957  6,028 
Over age for grade  0.147  0.354  6,028 
Teen parent at baseline  0.170  0.376  6,028 
Dropout at baseline  0.150  0.357  6,028 
Months Enrolled  3.591  1.574  4,862 
Months Enrolled, HS-graduate Imputation  3.664  1.530  5,173 
Months Enrolled, LOCF Imputation  3.518  1.617  5,908 
Months Enrolled, Worst-Case Imputation  3.144  1.909  6,028 
Rate of Attendance  0.749  0.332  4,697 
Rate of Attendance, HS-Graduates Imputation  0.770  0.325  5,030 
Rate of Attendance, LOCF Imputation  0.740  0.347  5,826 
Rate of Attendance, Worst-Case Imputation  0.643  0.412  6,028 
Rate of Unexcused Absences  0.187  0.342  4,697 
Rate of Unexcused Absences, HS-Graduate Imputation  0.171  0.331  5,030 
Rate of Unexcused Absences, LOCF Imputation  0.202  0.357  5,826 
Rate of Unexcused Absences, Worst-Case Imputation  0.309  0.432  6,028 
HS Graduate  0.070  0.256  6,028 
Attrition Rate  0.221  0.415  6,028 
Attrition Rate | HS-Graduate Imputation  0.166  0.372  6,028 
Attrition Rate | LOCF Imputation  0.042  0.202  6,028 
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Table 5 - Estimated Treatment Effects on Attrition Measures, Full Sample & Subgroups 
              
   Dependent Variable    
      Attrition | Imputation  Attrition |   
  Attrition  for HS Graduates  LOCF Imputation  Sample 
Sample trait  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  Size 
Full Sample  0.0083  0.0082  -0.0048  -0.0083  0.0056  0.0064  6,028 
 (0.0170)  (0.0182)  (0.0160)  (0.0171)  (0.0108)  (0.0115)   
Female 0.0261  0.0241  -0.0011  -0.0092  -0.0067  -0.0048  3,395 
 (0.0217)  (0.0243)  (0.0199)  (0.0218)  (0.0158)  (0.0169)   
Male -0.0045  -0.0091  -0.0044  -0.0071  0.0225*  0.0190  2,633 
 (0.0222)  (0.0264)  (0.0220)  (0.0260)  (0.0122)  (0.0148)   
Minority 0.0006  0.0021  -0.0019  -0.0062  -0.0001  -0.0036  1,471 
 (0.0273)  (0.0298)  (0.0301)  (0.0328)  (0.0267)  (0.0257)   
Not a Minority  0.0095  0.0109  -0.0047  -0.0085  0.0047  0.0095  4,557 
 (0.0191)  (0.0210)  (0.0175)  (0.0190)  (0.0111)  (0.0125)   
Teen Parent  0.0960**  0.0966*  0.0771**  0.0729*  0.0673  0.0433  1,024 
 (0.0365)  (0.0484)  (0.0346)  (0.0375)  (0.0455)  (0.0522)   
Not a Teen Parent  -0.0119  -0.0173  -0.0158  -0.0207  -0.0062  -0.0046  5,004 
 (0.0176)  (0.0187)  (0.0173)  (0.0184)  (0.0089)  (0.0093)   
Dropout 0.1003**  0.0215  0.1016**  0.0260  0.0508  0.0184  904 
 (0.0432)  (0.0570)  (0.0436)  (0.0557)  (0.0315)  (0.0468)   
Not a Dropout  -0.0056  -0.0049  -0.0207  -0.0246  0.0001  0.0033  5,124 
 (0.0170)  (0.0184)  (0.0149)  (0.0159)  (0.0104)  (0.0118)   
County FE  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no   
Entry-Month FE  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no   
Semester FE  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no   
County/Entry-Month FE  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes   
Semester/Entry-Month FE  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes   
County/Semester FE  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes    
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity clustered at the 
county/entry-month level. All models condition on the nine baseline observables. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.              
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Table 6 - Estimated Treatment Effects by Imputation Method 
            
   Dependent variable 
  Months  Rate of  Rate of 
Imputation Method  Enrolled  Attendance  Unexcused Absences 
Observed data  0.0875*  0.1165**  0.0201*  0.0230**  -0.0180*  -0.0219* 
 (0.0482)  (0.0530)  (0.0102)  (0.0110)  (0.0106)  (0.0114) 
HS-Graduate Imputation  0.1061**  0.1325**  0.0302** 0.0339**  -0.0271**  -0.0315** 
 (0.0531)  (0.0589)  (0.0128)  (0.0139)  (0.0128)  (0.0139) 
LOCF Imputation  0.1294**  0.1667*** 0.0300** 0.0339**  -0.0263**  -0.0315** 
 (0.0586)  (0.0626)  (0.0129)  (0.0141)  (0.0129)  (0.0140) 
Worst-Case Imputation  0.1386*  0.1674**  0.0364** 0.0405**  -0.0344**  -0.0396** 
 (0.0741)  (0.0777)  (0.0169)  (0.0180)  (0.0171)  (0.0181) 
Multiple Imputation  0.0951*  0.1191**  0.0302** 0.0336**  -0.0280**  -0.0319** 
 (0.0510)  (0.0542)  (0.0123)  (0.0129)  (0.0124)  (0.0131) 
            
County FE  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no 
Entry-Month FE  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no 
Semester FE  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no 
County/Entry-Month FE  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Semester/Entry-Month FE  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
County/Semester FE  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity clustered at the 
county/entry-month level. All models condition on the nine baseline observables. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    31
Table 7 - Estimated Treatment Effects by Time in Study and Imputation Method 
               
   Dependent Variable 
  Months Enrolled  Rate of Attendance  Rate of Unexcused Absences 
Independent  Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
                             







  (0.0540) (0.0511) (0.0525)  (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0147)  (0.0142)  (0.0141) (0.0140) 
Treatment x 2nd Semester in Study  0.1661** 0.1468**  0.1886** 0.0253*  0.0333**  0.0368**  -0.0193  -0.0246*  -0.0296* 
  (0.0699) (0.0709) (0.0720)  (0.0131) (0.0146) (0.0154)  (0.0139)  (0.0146) (0.0158) 
Treatment x 3rd Semester in Study  0.1135  0.1353  0.1618*  0.0141  0.0248  0.0273  -0.0144  -0.0237  -0.0249 
  (0.0886) (0.0890) (0.0828)  (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0170)  (0.0164)  (0.0181) (0.0174) 
Treatment x 4th Semester in Study  0.0885  0.1380  0.1840** 0.0227  0.0362*  0.0369**  -0.0217  -0.0347  -0.0347** 
  (0.0905) (0.1015) (0.0899)  (0.0166) (0.0218) (0.0178)  (0.0163)  (0.0212) (0.0172) 
Treatment x 5th Semester in Study  0.0762  0.1049  0.1522*  0.0119  0.0245  0.0246  -0.0137  -0.0262  -0.0246 
  (0.0899) (0.0898) (0.0895)  (0.0204) (0.0227) (0.0203)  (0.0203)  (0.0223) (0.0200) 
Treatment x 6th Semester in Study  0.2295  0.3162  0.3392  0.0121  0.0640  0.0362  -0.0314  -0.0777  -0.0474 
  (0.3357) (0.3104) (0.2171)  (0.0603) (0.0635) (0.0449)  (0.0674)  (0.0677) (0.0434) 
              
Missing outcome imputation  None  HS-Grads  LOCF  None HS-Grads LOCF  None HS-Grads LOCF 
Sample  size  4,862 5,173 5,908  4,697 5,030  5,826 4,697 5,030  5,826 
R-squared  0.518 0.445 0.460  0.469 0.308  0.385 0.491 0.345  0.423 
p-value  0.8747 0.9581 0.7327  0.8636 0.8354  0.8503 0.8526 0.7463  0.8426 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity clustered at the county/entry-month level. All models condition 
on baseline observables, county/entry-month FE, county/semester FE, and semester/entry-month FE. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   32
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Table 8 - Estimated Treatment Effects, Alternative Outcome Measures 
      
   Treatment  Standard  Control-Group 
Binary Outcome Variable  Estimate  Error  Mean 
Months enrolled = 4.5  0.0424**  0.0185  0.647 
Months enrolled ≥ 4.0  0.0373**  0.0164  0.684 
Months enrolled ≥ 3.0  0.0379**  0.0163  0.746 
Months enrolled ≥ 2.0  0.0396*** 0.0130  0.791 
Months enrolled ≥ 1.0  0.0326**  0.0140  0.847 
Months enrolled > 0  0.0340**  0.0139  0.870 
Attendance rate = 1.0  0.0267  0.0177  0.160 
Attendance rate ≥ 0.9  0.0541**  0.0236  0.477 
Attendance rate ≥ 0.75  0.0400**  0.0173  0.693 
Attendance rate ≥ 0.50  0.0363**  0.0157  0.784 
Attendance rate ≥ 0.25  0.0236*  0.0141  0.823 
Attendance rate ≥ 0.10  0.0216  0.0147  0.836 
Attendance rate = 0  -0.0246*  0.0148  0.160 
Rate of Unexcused Absences = 0  0.0428*  0.0222  0.455 
Rate of Unexcused Absences ≤ 0.10  0.0363*  0.0186  0.685 
Rate of Unexcused Absences ≤ 0.25  0.0363**  0.0154  0.761 
Rate of Unexcused Absences ≤ 0.50  0.0331**  0.0149  0.803 
Rate of Unexcused Absences ≤ 0.75  0.0212  0.0141  0.829 
Rate of Unexcused Absences ≤ 0.90  0.0244  0.0148  0.837 
Rate of Unexcused Absences = 1  -0.0259*  0.0147  0.159 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
clustered at the county/entry-month level. All models condition on baseline 
observables, county/entry-month FE, county/semester FE, and semester/entry-
month FE. The outcome measures reflect LOCF imputations for missing values. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 9 - Estimated Treatment Effects by Subgroup 
    
 Dependent  variable 
  Months  Rate of  Rate of 
Subgroup Enrolled  Attendance  Unexcused  Absences 
Female 0.1408  0.0364  -0.0319 
 (0.1032)  (0.0258)  (0.0248) 
Male 0.1558**  0.0267  -0.0266 
 (0.0772)  (0.0196)  (0.0184) 
Minority 0.2089  0.0300  -0.0297 
 (0.1622)  (0.0269)  (0.0276) 
Non-minority 0.1582**  0.0356**  -0.0311* 
 (0.0628)  (0.0166)  (0.0158) 
Over age for grade  0.4829**  0.0593  -0.0736 
 (0.2174)  (0.0490)  (0.0505) 
Not over age for grade  0.1430**  0.0324**  -0.0297** 
 (0.0596)  (0.0149)  (0.0143) 
Teen parent  0.5045  0.0668  -0.0772 
 (0.3553)  (0.0864)  (0.0887) 
Not a teen parent  0.0835*  0.0203  -0.0173 
 (0.0503)  (0.0130)  (0.0123) 
Dropout 0.5370*  0.0626  -0.0815 
 (0.2725)  (0.0609)  (0.0627) 
Not a dropout  0.1164**  0.0265**  -0.0209* 
   (0.0558)  (0.0119)  (0.0114) 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity clustered at the 
county/entry-month level. All models condition on baseline observables, county/entry-month FE, 
county/semester FE, and semester/entry-month FE. The outcome measures reflect LOCF 
imputations for missing values. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 